Satisfaction conditions in anticipatory mechanisms by unknown
Satisfaction conditions in anticipatory mechanisms
Marcin Miłkowski
Received: 25 July 2014 / Accepted: 13 February 2015 / Published online: 6 March 2015
 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to present a general mechanistic framework
for analyzing causal representational claims, and offer a way to distinguish gen-
uinely representational explanations from those that invoke representations for
honorific purposes. It is usually agreed that rats are capable of navigation (even in
complete darkness, and when immersed in a water maze) because they maintain a
cognitive map of their environment. Exactly how and why their neural states give
rise to mental representations is a matter of an ongoing debate. I will show that
anticipatory mechanisms involved in rats’ evaluation of possible routes give rise to
satisfaction conditions of contents, and this is why they are representationally
relevant for explaining and predicting rats’ behavior. I argue that a naturalistic
account of satisfaction conditions of contents answers the most important objections
of antirepresentationalists.
Keywords Representation  Antirepresentationalism  Hard Problem of Content 
Satisfaction conditions  Cognitive map  Anticipatory representation
The notion of representation has recently come under fervent attack. The proponents
of the dynamic and enactive accounts of cognition suggest that the notion can be
entirely eliminated from behavioral and cognitive sciences (Keijzer 2001; Garzon
2008; Chemero 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013). Ramsey (2007) argues that a large
number of appeals to representation in cognitive sciences and neuroscience can be
explained away in a deflationary manner; in his opinion, simple feature detectors
and tracking mechanisms do not warrant genuinely representational talk. He also
stresses that a successful theory of representation should meet the challenge of
specifying the representational role of representational tokens in the cognitive
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system (this is called the ‘‘job description challenge’’ by Ramsey). A similar
challenge, called ‘‘A Hard Problem of Content,’’ has been voiced by Hutto and
Myin (2013) who claim that no naturalized semantics to date can account for
content with satisfaction conditions. But if both challenges are met, then the charge
of the overly liberal use of representation is unjustified.
I will answer the job description challenge by solving the Hard Problem of
Content. If there is a role for contents with satisfaction conditions in cognitive
systems, then this role is eo ipso representational. This is why I show how one can
naturalistically account for satisfaction conditions of representational contents by
offering a template of a representational mechanism. This template may be filled
variously, and the particulars are to be decided by empirical evidence. In this paper,
only one such filling will be offered.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I first introduce the idea of
representational mechanisms to account for current research in ethology, cognitive
science, and neuroscience. Then, I present a particular subspecies of representa-
tional mechanisms, anticipatory mechanisms, and show how they are sensitive to
truth values of their contents. This framework is applied to the example of
evaluating future routes in rats as based on current neuroscience. I articulate an
intermediate conclusion and argue that anticipation gives rise to truth values of
content, and deal with some possible objections. In conclusion, I show how the
account of representational mechanisms vindicates a robust notion of representation.
Representational mechanisms
My strategy for answering anti-representational attacks is to sketch a general
mechanistic framework, the purpose of which is to constrain the notion of
representation without deciding which features representational mechanisms may
have, as this may be discovered only empirically. The mechanistic framework is
now one of the most successful accounts of explanation in special sciences, and has
been used to analyze causal explanatory strategies in special sciences. For a recent
review, see Illari and Williamson (2011). While definitions of mechanisms offered
by various authors accentuate different aspects, the main idea can be summarized as
follows: mechanisms are complex structures, involving organized components and
interacting processes or activities that contribute jointly to a capacity of the
structure. Mechanistic explanation is a species of causal explanation, and
interactions of components are framed in causal terms.
There are advantages to using this framework. First, the mechanistic explanation
requires that we specify the capacity or capacities of the mechanism (the
explanandum phenomenon), which is then explained causally. This can serve to
naturalize representation. Second, mechanistic explanation focuses on the organi-
zation of the system, and it requires that the exact role of a representation be
specified. Representations cannot float freely without being part of a complex
system.
My first step is therefore to describe the phenomenon to be explained, or the
capacities of representational mechanisms. I will specify these capacities in
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representational terms and sketch how they are interrelated, without going deeper
into their possible causal bases. The second step is to show a particular case study of
an anticipatory representational mechanism that actually explains the representa-
tional phenomena. In other words, the burden of naturalizing of representational
phenomena is shifted to particular causal explanations. It is obviously not enough to
define representational capacities to naturalize them; the causal bases have to be
given as well. But these causal bases are discoverable only empirically, and they
cannot be reliably derived from one’s armchair. Moreover, representational
capacities are specified here abstractly enough to be realized in a variety of
different mechanisms with different causal structures. The only things that can be
specified in a philosophical analysis are the requirements that such causal
explanations should satisfy. This much—and only this much—is provided in this
section of the paper.
While representational mechanisms may be used to explain larger mechanisms, I
focus on them as explananda. Depending on how the explanatory problem is posed,
the capacity of a representational mechanism may be framed in various ways. What
is common is that the representational mechanism has the capacity to make some
information available for the cognitive system (Miłkowski 2013). The information
in this case becomes semantic as far as it modifies the readiness of the system to act
one way or another. More precisely, the conditional probabilities of actions of the
system are modified appropriately given the information (MacKay 1969).
By framing the capacity of the representational mechanism as modification of the
readiness to act, based on the information available to the cognitive system, this
framework is committed to two theses. First, representation is essentially action-
oriented, though this orientation does not mean that all representations directly
activate effectors of the system, or that representation simply controls the motor
activity of the system. There might be content that is not exploited in action; what is
altered is just the readiness to act. The notion of action is to be understood liberally
to include cognition. Second, the account makes use of the notion of information.
Though there are various mathematical measures of information, they should not be
confused with the notion of information, as MacKay (1969) stressed. All we need
for our purposes here is that there is a physical medium with at least two degrees of
freedom (or two levels of logical depth) that make a difference to the behavior of the
system; in other words, the system reacts differently to at least two distinct states of
the physical medium. The notion of information introduced informally here is
equivalent to structural information.1
Typical explanatory texts cite other important capacities of representational
mechanisms. The notion of representation is introduced to talk about targets (or
referents, or extension) of the representation, and to talk about the characteristics of
the targets (or intension). In addition, the information cannot simply sit in the
1 MacKay defines structural information content as ‘‘number of distinguishable groups or clusters in a
representation—the number of definably independent respects in which it could vary—its dimensionality
or number of degrees of freedom’’ (MacKay 1969: 165). By representation, he means anything that has
features that ‘‘purport to symbolize or correspond in some sense with those of some other structure’’. His
notion is not to be confused with a stronger notion used throughout this paper.
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mechanism; the system has to care about it somehow. Thus, there are at least three
other essential capacities of the mechanism in question:
(a) Referring to the target (if any) of the representation;
(b) Identifying the characteristics of the target;
(c) Evaluating the epistemic value of information about the target.
While the first two capacities bear close resemblance to traditional notions of
extension and intension, the third is supposed to link the mechanism with the work
of the agent or system.
One might object that including the characteristics of the target violates the
principle of parsimony. For example, proponents of the causal theory of reference
dispose of the remnants of the idea of intension altogether (Fodor 1992). But
referential opacity, which is arguably a mark of genuine representation (Dennett
1969), is easily explained by appeal to the characteristics of the target. Without at
least minimal access to the characteristics, intensionality is hard to pin down.2 By
including the characteristics of the target as a feature of the representational
mechanisms, I do not suggest that it is impossible for (almost) purely extensional
representations to exist. The characteristics might be very minimal indeed, such as
bearing a particular label or being in a mental file (Re´canati 2012). The account of
representational mechanisms is ecumenical: whether a given system uses a richly-
structured medium or not is a matter for empirical investigation, and not for
armchair conceptual analysis.
The third capacity of the representational mechanism, namely evaluating the
epistemic value of information about the target, may seem misplaced, and not
directly related to representing at all. Granted, sometimes it may be beneficial to
abstract away from such factors; for example, formal grammars are usually not
related to any epistemic values. Nevertheless, in many psychological and behavioral
theories, a complete story about representing is linked to a story about the adaptive
value of the representation for the organism in question.
These three representational capacities are interlinked. The semantic information
that modifies the readiness for action of the cognitive system, which may be in the
form of characteristics of the target or simply indicate the target, is what is
epistemically evaluable. To evaluate the information already present in the system,
the mechanism needs to be able to compare two sets of characteristics of the target.
Epistemic evaluation requires more than negative feedback in the information-
processing mechanism: this feedback simply modifies the system’s input value.
What is required instead is that the error is detected by the system. The idea that
2 In Fodor’s account, the syntactical properties of vehicles of content are supposed to play the role
traditionally assigned to Fregean senses or modes of presentation. This, however, presupposes that
homonymy of tokens of Mentalese is impossible. However, neural codes in the brain are highly context-
dependent, and one cannot rely on their vehicular properties to be one-to-one mapped to their contents;
neither in firing rate encoding, nor in temporal phase encoding; cf. (Rieke et al. 1999). Irrelevant of the
question whether homonymy is possible or not, vehicular properties do not have satisfaction conditions,
and content has. Solving the Hard Problem of Content requires a substantial account of how satisfaction




system-detectable error gives rise to genuine representationality is by no means
new. For an extended argument, see Bickhard (1993).
What are the mechanisms that can display representational capacities? The
neomechanistic answer to this question is: those whose parts and operations
contribute causally to certain patterns of their functioning which can be seen as
specifying or modifying their characteristics of targets, which can be predicted and
explained as referring to targets, and which have certain information-related
operations. In other words, all usual pragmatics of mechanistic explanation apply
here; the explanation should offer new predictions, be general, the entities should be
causally relevant, and the causal model of the mechanism has to include all the parts
and operations of a representational mechanism. This may sound somewhat vague
but the thought is straightforward: if there is no explanatory gain in positing
representational capacities in a system, the mechanism in question is not to be
explained representationally. That is to say, if there is a simpler causal explanation
of a mechanism, and it has the same predictive power related to different
interventions in the mechanism, a more complex explanation has to be rejected as
spurious.
A chair standing on a floor is not explained correctly as the mechanism that
displays a capacity to think that it is located where it should be. Even if one could
produce such a spurious explanation and stipulate that the chair as a whole is a
bearer of information that characterizes its best location, there are no parts of the
chair whose function is to specify that chair or its optimal placing (for example, by
being similar to the chair). The chair also does not detect any error if it is moved,
and there are no multiple levels of organization of the chair where information
vehicles and error information play relevant causal roles. Finally, all such
‘‘explanations’’ are spurious and trivial as they cannot supply any new true
predictions.
Let’s take a slightly more complex system: a mouse trap. It is not usefully
explained as desiring to catch mice even though intentional stance descriptions and
predictions of the trap’s operation may be correct though trivial. This is because
there are no information bearers of the alleged desire that would be changed
appropriately if the mouse trap catches my finger rather than a mouse. For this
reason, there is no capacity to evaluate the desire allegedly satisfied in a trap by
catching mice. So even if a mouse trap could be used as a (fallible) mouse detector,
its functioning does not include any operations on information bearers which could
be understood as correcting or signaling errors.
But what about simple negative feedback systems such as the notorious Watt
governor? I submit that these are not representational mechanisms, either. The Watt
governor is a mechanical device for stabilizing the speed of the steam engine and its
work is usually explained in terms of control theory. It is used as a metaphor for
the dynamical account of cognition (Van Gelder 1995). The governor is formed by
two heavy balls on a frame that is driven by the engine. The centrifugal force makes
them go up or down, which closes and opens the steam valve. So, there is negative
feedback between the speed as detected by the centrifugal governor and the engine.
Yet even if one analyzes the Watt governor in information-processing terms, as
Bechtel (1998) or Nielsen (2010) do, the structure of the system does not contain
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any error-processing routines. Instead of evaluating and modifying its previous
output information (the ‘‘signal’’ to open or close the valve), it simply changes its
operation by having different input (balls move up or down). Thus, the Watt
governor does not detect any error in the information: although in the eyes of the
beholder, it might have misrepresented the state of the steam engine that it controls;
the error is not system-detectable. Hence, the present account is not as liberal as the
previous mechanistic analyses of the Watt governor (Bechtel 1998). There is no
special representational role to be played by the states of the governor.
System-detectability of error may be realized in various ways. For example, the
system may have multiple independent sources of information (Dretske 1986). The
system might also use the characteristics of future action of an organism to control
the action A of the system and to check whether A is successful; if the success of A
is presupposed by another action B, the lack of success falsifies the information
contained in the presupposition related to these characteristics (Bickhard 1993). The
third solution is to use previous input information to predict the future input state
and then to compare with that state. Although the two latter solutions are somewhat
similar to negative feedback, they are different in that they imply the processing of
information on multiple levels. This is typical, for example, for contemporary
predictive processing frameworks (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), in which a model of
the future state of the system is built, and then the model is compared with that state,
when it occurs; from a technical point of view, the model becomes another source of
information, though not statistically independent. A complete description of the
representational mechanism needs to detail the structure of the evaluation subsystem
by specifying the exact way that the mechanism detects vehicular discrepancy
between two pieces of input information or between the model and the input
information.
A view close to the one presently defended has been advocated by Burge (2010).
Burge claims that a necessary condition for the substantial use of the notion of
representation is that there is a non-trivial use of veridicality conditions in the theory
that ascribes the representation to a creature. Burge answers Ramsey’s challenge by
placing veridicality as a necessary condition of application of the notion of
representation. The paradigmatic case of non-trivial appeal to veridicality for Burge
is perceptual constancy, for example, size constancy. The retinal image of an object
varies with distance but the perceived size of the object remains the same. However,
perceptual constancies may be present in virtue of different mechanisms operating
on various time-scales. Some might involve simply tracking rates of change in the
stimulus, and others complex integration of sensory inputs. Thus, in some cases
there might be error-checking (and veridicality) involved, while in others the appeal
to representation may be superfluous.
Burge stresses that veridicality is crucial, whereas error-based accounts of
representation consider the lack of veridicality as the paradigmatic case of error.
Even if error detection is implemented as a discrepancy check in the neural system,
not all discrepancy checks count as representational error detection. Consider a
robot that scans for an accidental change in raw data by using a standard error-
detecting code. Such raw data is not necessarily the representation of the robot
unless the data is used in such a way as to justify the claim that it refers to or
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describes something. Mere error-checking is not enough; and the stress on
veridicality is correct insofar as description of the functioning of the representa-
tional mechanism needs to invoke the target being represented (or misrepresented).
If the mechanistically correct, complete explanation of the robot’s functioning
mentions no target, and no characteristics of the target, there is no need to posit
representation.
The framework of representational mechanisms specifies their capacities and
describes conditions that the various mechanisms must fulfill in order to qualify as
representational. These conditions are both necessary and sufficient, and though
highly abstract, they guarantee not only that the mechanisms store and process
information that modifies their readiness to act, but also that they are, at least in some
cases, able to refer to targets, identify them, and evaluate the value of the information
stored. This way, representational mechanisms are able to detect that they are in error
(via evaluation of the epistemic value) and, at least in some cases, are prone to
misidentification of targets because of referential opacity. Both aspects, namely
system-detectable error (highlighted by Bickhard) and referential opacity (empha-
sized by Dennett), have been discussed as possible bases for causal relevance of
content as content. We will see this in more detail in the example of prospective
planning of routes in rats, introduced in Anticipating future paths in the maze section
of this paper. It will also causally explain how satisfaction conditions of content arise.
Anticipatory mechanisms
Anticipatory representational mechanisms not only represent but do so in an
anticipatory manner; they anticipate the future characteristics of the represented
target. Such capacities are widely posited in current cognitive science and
neuroscience as related to conditioning (Schultz and Dickinson 2000; Lauwereyns
2011) and forward models (Pickering and Clark 2014), but the conception has its
roots in Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inferences as inherent in active movements
of the eye: a motor signal from the central nervous system is sent both to the motor
system and, as a copy, to an internal forward model (Meulders 2010).
In this paper, I distinguish anticipation from prediction. The latter term may be
used to refer to a process of inferring current events; for example, in the predictive
coding framework, the brain is usually tasked with predicting current sensations,
given their causes—only in generalized predictive coding does the task potentially
cover both current and future sensations (Friston et al. 2011). In what follows, I
assume that only predicting future sensations is anticipatory. Therefore, the current
account does not imply the predictive brain theory of (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013),
and is merely consistent with the latter. But some of the brain’s predictions may be
anticipatory. As there is a significant role for error correction in the predictive brain
theory, mechanisms posited by this theory to deal with future sensations will be
anticipatory representational mechanisms.
To posit an anticipatory representational mechanism in a cognitive system is to
reject two claims. First, the current account rejects anti-representationalism. These
anticipatory mechanisms meet Ramsey’s challenge; by appeal to them, one can
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show the way in which representation is both causally relevant and useful for
cognitive systems. They also solve the Hard Problem of Content. Specifically, the
anticipatory representations have truth values and can be falsified (or confirmed) by
the cognitive system on its own. Second, it rejects the simplistic idea that
representing is nothing over and above having information about past and present
sensory stimuli. But what is the positive claim?
Let me introduce the idea of a modeling relationship as presented by Rosen
(1991, 2012), which can be used to shed some light on anticipation. His theory is
framed in terms of category theory, but the idea is straightforward. The natural
system is modeled by a formal system if and only if the causal process in the natural
system is congruent with three elements: (a) measurement of a value of the natural
system; (b) inference on that value; and (c) the inferred value in terms of some
physical quantity. This means that there is a mapping (at least a homomorphism)
between two entities: (1) measurement values encoded by the formal system,
inferences on values, and inferred values, decoded in terms of physical quantities,
and (2) the natural system.3
Having defined the modeling relationship, we can now define the anticipatory
system as one ‘‘containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its environment,
which allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions
pertaining to a later instant’’ (Rosen 2012, 312). Based on values measured in the
cognitive system itself or in its environment, the model is fed with these values and
used to predict their later states. Without the model there would not be any changes
of state in the anticipatory system (nor would it be an anticipatory system in Rosen’s
sense).
One important distinction between two kinds of anticipatory systems was
introduced by Dubois (2003). Weak anticipation (or exo-anticipation) uses
externally-produced data to internally model future states of the environment,
while strong anticipation (or endo-anticipation) uses internally-produced data to
model future internal states [cf. also (Collier 2008)]. Some authors argue that strong
anticipation is not necessarily related to internal models and point to the
phenomenon of anticipating synchronization (Stepp and Turvey 2010). In this
case, however, strong anticipation might be reducible to weak anticipation, at least
explanatorily. Especially in the case of coupled and synchronized systems, one
might be tempted to eliminate the notion of representation altogether. However, in
3 Rosen makes some assumptions that are not exactly essential for the modeling relationship; for
example, he doesn’t acknowledge that one could model a natural system in a non-causal manner. The
definition of a modeling relationship should not decide whether non-causal modeling is really modeling
or not; it simply needs an additional argument, and Rosen fails to offer one. But even opponents of the
idea of causality in fundamental physics (Russell 1912; Ross and Spurrett 2007) need not reject Rosen’s
analysis of modeling if they simply substitute ‘causation’ with any term they think would best describe
the basic structure of physical processes. Also, the notion of inference needs not be understood as
entailment in a logical calculus (after all, not all formal systems are logical calculi, and not all
computation in formal systems is simply derivation of steps in a proof, even if all formal systems can be
described by logical calculi); all we need is that there is an algorithm described by the formal system,
which encodes measured values, and decodes them in terms of physical quantities. But note: Non-
encoded values, or values that were not measured, are abstracted away, and ignored in models, yet this
does not undermine the modeling relationship.
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anticipatory representational mechanisms, the organization of the mechanism
requires more than anticipating synchronization.
The anticipatory representational system has the capacity to derive its own future
state, and that future state is evaluated epistemically, for example by comparing
whether there is a vehicular discrepancy between expected sensory information (the
future state) and actual sensory input. The discrepancy is typically used to correct
the error for future derivations of states. Any anticipatory system that has these error
correction mechanisms is already a representational mechanism in the sense used
here. The anticipation is generated to be evaluated later. Hence, it has truth-value
and can be falsified by the system. Mere structural information cannot be falsified
but a prediction about the future state of the system can. However, if there is no
error correction, there need not be any truth evaluation involved. For example,
anticipating synchronization in strongly-coupled dynamical systems does not have
any role for error correction, and it therefore does not need to be representational at
all.
Hutto (2013) argues that action-oriented accounts of representation cannot offer a
viable notion of causally relevant content because ‘‘the contents of representations
do not make a causal difference, only formal or vehicular properties do;’’ when one
assumes computationalism, then the only causally relevant factors are forms of
symbols in computers, irrelevant of their semantics. Though it has been recently
argued that computation may be essentially content-involving (Rescorla 2012), I
will not pursue this line of argument here. Let’s assume that only formal or
vehicular properties make causal difference in computers. The work of my
computer would be explained by referring to software and hardware components
involved; in particular, one is able to explain how the words I had typed appeared on
the screen. This seems right; my computer does not know the truth value of my
statements.
But the existence of a computational explanation does not exclude the possibility
that that there is a deeper cause of the words on the screen. Obviously, without
learning English, I wouldn’t be able to type these meaningful sentences. There is
another larger causal explanation, the one related to the content of my statements
that I wanted to include in my paper. The computational explanation is just a part of
that complete representational explanation (Miłkowski 2013), which also includes
my mental representation and contents.
The complete representational explanation has a different phenomenon to
explain: not just the appearance of pixels on the screen but also the appearance of
words qua meaningful bits on the screen. Only some pixel configurations
correspond to meaningful statements, so while formal computational explanations
explain why a particular configuration appeared, they do not explain why it was one
that corresponds to a meaningful statement, the one that has a truth-value. Hutto
conflates a proximate cause of the appearance of words with a distal one, and does
not see that there is a further fact to be explained. But the proximate cause does not
explain why only some configurations of letters appear on my screen, given the fact
that the keyboard is able to send various signals to my computer.
Even if one grants that computational mechanisms are sensitive only to vehicular
properties, it does not follow that I am not sensitive to satisfaction conditions of my
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representations. My computational mechanisms make it possible to compare
expectations with current states of affairs, and while the comparison may be purely
computational, it is embedded in a larger process which makes it semantic at the
same time; that process controls my behavior and definitely involves truth
conditions. Otherwise, why should I correct myself when I make a typo? Why
shouldn’t I just press a random sequence of keys? Hutto has no credible answer to
these questions, and his passing the buck to social practices is a non-starter without
an account of social emergence of truth values.
Anticipating future paths in the maze
Cognitive maps in rats have long been a topic of debate in psychology (Tolman
1948). For a theory of mental representation, they are a specially interesting case.
They are structured, even compositional, but not reducible to language-like symbol
media (Rescorla 2009); they constitute an instance of what Cummins (1996) calls S-
Representation without being simply picture-like representations. But for mechan-
ism, a complete explanation requires putting cognitive maps in a broader context of
the brain architecture. In particular, it is extremely important to link maps with
actions and evaluation mechanisms linked with reward subsystems in the brain.
At first, cognitive maps seemed to be necessary for explaining the navigational
capacities of rats, but later the role of cognitive maps was questioned; even if
contemporary neuroscience vindicates the existence of cognitive maps by locating
them in the hippocampus (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978; Redish 1999; Derdikman and
Moser 2010), it is still not universally accepted that rats exploit them in navigation.
Tolman wasn’t overly clear when he introduced the term ‘cognitive map’, and gave
no definition in his seminal paper. One may enumerate at least three meanings that
commonly occur in the literature: (1) the trivial meaning, in which a cognitive map
is any mechanism involved in spatial navigation, (2) the loose meaning, in which
the map is simply any representation that models geometric aspects of the
environment, and (3) the strict meaning, in which cognitive maps have a format
typical of maps, so that they not only represent geometric aspects but do so in a
geometric manner (Rescorla 2009, 381). Cognitive maps in the trivial sense are
always present in all spatially navigating animals. The debate about the existence of
cognitive maps focuses on the loose and strict renderings of the notion.
The reason given for skepticism that rats have cognitive maps is that even in
circumstances in which they would be useful, rats are unable to reach their goals
(Whishaw 1991; Benhamou 1996). They prefer simple visual cues, so there seems
no reason to assume multimodal cognitive mapping in rats; their behavior would be
fully explainable in terms of tracking environmental cues, just like tropisms or taxis
are used in simpler organisms. Invertebrates navigate successfully without
multimodal integration (Cruse and Wehner 2011).
This is why proponents of radical enactive cognition (REC), such as Hutto and
Myin (2013), can claim that a rat’s mind is, to use their phrase, a basic mind without
content. Though Hutto and Myin do not define the notion of the ‘basic mind’, it
seems to refer to animal minds and to human minds not engaged in any linguistic
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activity. Proponents of REC would admit that there are structures in a rat’s brain
that carry information about the environment, but they claim that information does
not constitute truth-evaluable content. Hence, the S-representation account of
cognitive maps (Cummins and Roth 2012) cannot be used to argue against REC.
Also, even if it is undeniable that the notion of representation has been used
heuristically in biological research on rat navigation (Bechtel 2014), it does not
mean that there is a viable naturalist account of truth-evaluable content as embodied
in the brain. What is missing is a substantial account of satisfaction conditions of
various representations involved in rat navigation.
Rat navigation is quite complex. Behavioral experiments confirm that, at least in
some cases, rats are able to return to their starting position, even if they were
exploring the environment in complete darkness, devoid of smell (in a water
platform or a water maze), and without whiskers to orient towards walls, simply by
using their motor signals and vestibular system (Cheung et al. 2012). One problem
with confirming a hypothesis about cognitive maps is that experiments need to be
conducted in darkness, and one of the kind of neural cells responsible for
navigation—head direction cells—becomes unstable after 3 min in darkness, while
place and grid cells (other components of the neural system of navigation) fire stably
for half an hour longer. Cheung et al. (2012) have shown that using maps beyond
3 min is theoretically implausible and landmarks alone cannot suffice for a stable
positional representation. Therefore, a complex organization involving both maps
and cue-tracking emerges.
Navigation in rats uses various kinds of information, and the hippocampus in
rodents has the function of integrating various sources of information (Lisman and
Redish 2009). There are hypotheses (Conklin and Eliasmith 2005) that this
integration involves using sensory information for error correction as rats obviously
make mistakes in their navigation. For example, misidentification of location is
possible as long as the structure of the environment matches the structure encoded
by place cells, and even if the mistake is undetected by the rat, it is explainable by
assuming that the rat misrepresented the current or future locations (Ferbinteanu and
Shapiro 2003). Referential opacity is therefore possible for cognitive maps: the
structure of the environment as represented by the cognitive map may match two
targets, but only one would be the proper one considering the existence of goals of
the animal. Because the animal makes mistakes in orienting towards its goals in
such a geometrically similar environment, we must explain its mistakes as being
caused by misrepresentation.
While the hippocampus plays multiple functions, there is substantial empirical
evidence that landmark location is retrieved in an anticipatory fashion.4 The
hippocampus is known to be related to memory function, and one of the
fundamental features of memory is control of current behavior. It also directs
behavior to receive reward and avoid negative consequences. This in turn requires
using memory to predict the outcomes of more complex actions. Currently, at least
4 Rats, according to some (Naqshbandi and Roberts 2006), lack prospective memory, or the kind of
memory involved in planning future action in larger timescales, even if there is some indirect evidence for
this (Wilson and Crystal 2012). Whatever the case may be, anticipation in representational mechanisms is
not required to span larger timescales.
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two predictive mechanisms related to evaluating future paths towards valuable goals
in rats are known: one related to temporal encoding, where cells encoding future
locations are activated along with current ones on place fields, and another with
sharp-wave-ripple effects. I will discuss each.
Experiments show that many spikes fired by place cells actually represent a
position ahead of the rat (Johnson and Redish 2007; Lisman and Redish 2009).5
These spikes are called sweeps. For example, if the rat place cells encode a sequence
of places A, B,…, G, then when it is located on A, the G cell will also fire. Sweeps
do not occur when the animal is on a running wheel. Hence, there is a specific way
of modeling the future location in place cells (using phase precession that does not
occur normally, so the rat can distinguish between anticipating and actually being
located at the landmark). These anticipations are only about locations less than a
meter from the current position of the rat where the animal will usually arrive in a
few seconds.
Mere evidence for anticipatory encoding of location does not suffice to establish
that the path integration mechanism is actually representational. As I claimed above,
an evaluation subsystem is also needed. This is exactly what is hypothesized in the
recent research on rats: while rats stop at difficult places in the maze and the
hippocampus engages in sweeps related to future paths in the maze, the ventral
striatum is the evaluation subsystem (van der Meer and Redish 2010). In terms of
computational neuroscience, these brain areas form a so-called actor–critic
architecture; one executes and plans actions, and another sends a signal about the
correctness of actions (basically, a prediction error). While actor–critic algorithms
are prevalent in the literature on reinforcement learning, not all reinforcement
learning algorithms require models. Shea (2014) defends a claim that even basic
temporal difference algorithms are substantially representational. This would mean
that REC cannot possibly be right about any organism capable of reinforcement
learning. Enactive basic minds would be indeed very basic, and there would be no
meaningful application of REC to higher animals, not to mention humans. However,
Shea’s position is stronger than the one defended here; he claims that reward signals
are meta-representational, whereas in the current account the error information
needs not be representational (which would require an infinite regress of evaluation
subsystems for reward signals to make them representational). The reward signal is
taken literally as a signal of vehicular discrepancy between predicted and actual
reward. It is only the prediction that is representational in virtue of being evaluated.6
Still, there are kinds of temporal difference learning that are model-free.7 The
notion of the model as applied to reinforcement learning is understood as an internal
map of events and stimuli from the external world. As Dayan and Berridge explain:
5 This occurs in so-called theta phase precession; a relatively accessible account of the phenomenon as
related to place cells and reward can be found in van der Meer and Redish (2011).
6 At the same time, this difference is mostly terminological; ‘‘representation’’ is understood here as
necessarily involving evaluation mechanisms.
7 According to Dayan and Berridge (2014), even Pavlovian learning is model-based. This only
strengthens the case for representationalism.
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That internal model supports prospective assessment of the consequences of
taking particular actions. By contrast, model-free strategies have no model of
outside events; instead, learning takes place merely by caching information
about the utilities of outcomes encountered on past interactions with the
environment. This generates direct rules for how to behave, or propensities for
performing particular actions, on the basis of predictions of the long-run
values of actions. Model-free values can be described as being free-floating,
since they can become detached from any specific outcome. (Dayan and
Berridge 2014: 473)
A stronger case for representationalism would be model-based reinforcement
learning, with rich content that has satisfaction conditions. Model-free reinforce-
ment learning might rely merely on cached values and does not have access to
information about consequences of actions, which is required for planning of
complex tasks. It is inflexible; ‘‘because such cached action values are based only on
actual rewards received in the past, they cannot support latent learning, are not
available in novel situations, and are only reliable if the world does not change too
rapidly relative to the speed of learning’’ (van der Meer and Redish 2010). Including
models makes the organism much more flexible.
Rats are indeed flexible in planning their routes. The particular architecture
posited to explain sweeps and the work of the ventral striatum, or dynamic
evaluation lookahead, requires forward models. Dynamic evaluation lookahead is
defined as ‘‘evaluation of a future outcome that takes the agent’s current
motivational state into account’’ (van der Meer and Redish 2010). It is a two-step
process that requires prediction, then evaluation, of the outcome, mapping the
prediction onto a value usable for decision making. A forward model allows the
animal to predict the outcomes of different available actions; in contrast to simple
Pavlovian reinforcement learning, where the learned association is activated. There
is evidence that ventral striatum neurons respond to actual reward receipt and to
cues that predict it; and this dual encoding is required for a component to play a
critic role in the actor–critic architecture. Yet there is no direct evidence for some
parts of the proposed explanation of the rat’s behavior. For example, little is known
of the mechanism by which expectancies become linked to particular actions. The
actor part, the place cells, is better known, as the research on the encoding began in
the 1970s with the seminal work of O’Keefe and Nadel (1978). There is little doubt
that the place cells encode both structure of the environment and the routes to be
taken towards valuable goals. The properties of the place cells indicate that they
carry structural information about the environment and that information is used for
control or to modify the rat’s readiness to act. The structure can be evaluated, and
ventral striatum achieves this.
The second mechanism involved in representing future paths is related to finding
trajectories to a goal. The rat’s hippocampus generates brief sequences encoding
spatial trajectories strongly biased to progress from the subject’s current location to
a known goal location. Pfeiffer and Foster (2013) were able to find direct evidence
for the existence of future-focused navigational activity of place cells in a realistic
two-dimensional environment. They have elegantly shown that it is related to sharp-
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wave-ripple (SWR) events; SWRs are irregular bursts of brief (100–200 ms) large-
amplitude and high-frequency (140–200 Hz) neuronal activity in the hippocampus.
However, it is unclear how this mechanism is related to the first one, and whether or
not it uses the same evaluation subsystem. The researchers are investigating the
functional relevance of trajectory events in guiding behavior, particularly in terms
of how the hippocampus interfaces with brain regions involved in reward learning
and reward-based decision making.
Let me summarize. I have argued that current neuroscience has evidence for
anticipatory representational mechanisms involved in rat spatial orientation. Rats
are able to detect errors in their representation, which is related with reward-based
decision making and reinforcement learning, and this fulfills one of the criteria for
representational systems. The spiking activity of place cells (both firing rates and
phase precession) gives rise to a representation that has satisfaction conditions. The
properties of firing are vehicular properties, and vehicular properties do not have
satisfaction conditions. To conflate content/vehicle distinction is to commit a
category mistake; content has satisfaction conditions, and can be correct or not.
Vehicular properties contain structural information [logons in MacKay’s (1969)
terminology], which is used to control the action and make decisions. Hence, it
becomes semantic or control information. As long as actions fail, the reward
expectancies generated by place cells are falsified and the animal’s ventral striatum
sends appropriate prediction error signals to the actor. This is how the truth value
depends asymmetrically on vehicular processes of comparing the predicted reward
with the actual reward signal. Referential opacity is possible, which in turn relies on
characteristics, and this fulfills the second criterion. Consequently, we have a
naturalistically credible story about satisfaction conditions of content.
Intermediary conclusion: anticipatory mechanisms and the Hard Problem
of Content
Anticipatory mechanisms are a subspecies of the general category of representa-
tional mechanisms. It is particularly important for biological reasons, valuable for
planning ahead and avoiding future danger. In the case of navigation in rats, the
account of anticipatory mechanism, along with the empirical evidence cited,
vindicates representational ideas about using cognitive maps to predict the near
future. Granted, current knowledge of neural mechanisms in rats is incomplete and
the overall organization of navigational system in rodents may be different from
how it is hypothesized today. But for my purposes this is not particularly important.
The point was to show that anticipatory representational mechanisms are
explanatorily and predictively relevant entities, and they are parts of our current
best theories of rat navigation. By assuming that they operate during navigation, we
can make robust predictions. For example, there will be a specific kind of
anticipatory spiking or rats can be in error when placed in geometrically similar
mazes.
By looking at how place cells help predict the near future by prospectively
representing future paths in their environment, and how they evaluate these paths to
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choose the best route, we can see how an anticipatory mechanism may work in
detail, and also in a basic, prelinguistic mind. There is compelling evidence that
decision-making and reinforcement learning require forward models to control
action. Thus, basic minds without content, touted by REC, such as the ‘‘minds’’ of
amoebas or slime mold, are not particularly exciting for cognitive science. Most
animals have representational mechanisms with content that has satisfaction
conditions—conditions evaluable by reward-related mechanisms in the animal.
The main argument for REC—that correlation or similarity do not constitute
content—is cogent but remains irrelevant. Note that correlation and similarity
(structural informational relationships in general) are used to discover the structure
of vehicles of representation in the current proposal. In an anticipatory mechanism,
the truth bearer is neither the structural informational relationship itself, nor the
vehicle, but the content of the expectation that some future state of affairs will be
such and such. The expectation may have a format of S-representation in
Cummins’s (1996) sense, which means it is a model based on structural similarity
relationships, and one can decide the format of the representation by inquiring the
way the expectation is evaluated in the animal. When place cells are used for
navigation in a maze, they generate an expectation about the location of the goal
(linked with a reward) and a possible trajectory to the goal. The content of this
expectation is non-linguistic and is encoded in spatiotemporal relationships of
spikes in the place field. For all we know about the functioning of the hippocampus,
if the place field neurons were activated the way they normally do in a certain
environment E1, the rat would behave as if it were in E1, rather in some other
environment E2. The behavior of the rat is causally related to the spiking of place
fields, irrelevant of the fact whether the spiking is causally connected to E1 or not.
So, the rat may be in error. Mere structural informational relationship is, indeed, not
enough to constitute content. Only if the vehicles of information control the
behavior of the agent and are evaluated as controlling the behavior properly or not,
do they have satisfaction conditions. Once control information is evaluated, which
can be realized computationally on a vehicular level, it has satisfaction conditions.
Obviously, the vehicles must have their structure caused by something, and there
might be similarity relationships between vehicles and referents involved. However,
it is the evaluated control that constitutes content.
Possible objections
The satisfaction conditions are presupposed here rather than explained causally.
Note that the specification of the explanandum phenomenon indeed presupposes
that there are satisfaction conditions. But this is what explanandum is: this is
something to be explained, and the task of causal explanations is to explain how
satisfaction conditions arise. They do so because there are vehicular parts and
computational operations that perform discrepancy checks on representation
vehicles. Obviously, one can always deny that such vehicular operations have
anything to do with semantic satisfaction conditions, but this would be as silly as
denying that proof-theoretic algorithms are truth-constrained. Granted, in
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sufficiently rich calculi, there are logical truths that cannot be decided using proof-
theoretic algorithms, but this does not mean that these algorithms do not justify our
claims about all other true logical propositions. They do so because truth values
systematically depend on vehicular, syntactical properties of logical notation. Note
also that mechanistic explanations of rich representational phenomena involve
information processing on multiple levels of organization, and in multiple
subcomponents (such as the actor or critic module in the actor–critic architecture).
There is no job for the representation in the sweeps of the hippocampus.
According to Ramsey (2007), as long as there is S-representation, the job
description challenge has been met. Additionally, Cummins and Roth (2012) argued
plausibly that cognitive maps are S-representations. But there is a deeper answer;
the structure of the place field spikes enables the animal to plan its future behavior.
It involves characteristics of the targets. In addition, the content is shown to have
satisfaction conditions in a naturalistic, purely causal fashion. Hence, the challenge
is met.
There is no content in forward models. The falsification relies on simple
discrepancy detection, so one might be tempted to view it as syntactic only, and not
semantic. But it’s not only syntactic, as the reward signals are not merely signals
that there was prediction error. They are signals that the action of the animal is
appropriate or not; they have special biological significance. One can explain the
action of the rat as learning to find liquid chocolate in the maze (a reward) and not as
merely transforming sensory signals, generating spikes, and passing signals between
the hippocampus and the ventral striatum. The latter activities are typical for the
computational part of the representational mechanism, but the explanation of the
computational properties of the brain does not explain why the brain is directed
towards reward rather than otherwise. In a generic action prediction framework, an
animal can easily predict that it will die of thirst without drinking, and as long as the
animal is thirsty, there would be no prediction error. This is a version of the dark
room problem for the predictive coding (Friston et al. 2012). But real rats actively
seek fluids in such a situation because the reward information is related directly to
their well-being; it has basic physiological significance. We explain their behavior
as adaptive, and in this explanation, the story about the reward is an important
complement of the merely informational or computational story about the brain. The
computational mechanism is embedded in a living organism that uses it to process
information and to represent the consequences of its actions. Satisfaction conditions,
naturalized, are linked with reward signals in this case.
This is non-interesting, low-level stuff. Rats are much simpler than human beings,
and their hippocampus is different. But REC claims that basic minds are without
content. The present paper, as well as Shea (2014), demonstrates that all minds
capable of reinforcement learning and having prospective functionality of the
hippocampus are representational. The data about adult human beings is contro-
versial as they are no longer basic minds in REC sense; human beings are essentially
social and linguistic, so the claim that semantic content is merely linguistic couldn’t
be defeated by reference to humans. In addition, the debate about content in basic
minds shouldn’t involve complex issues of folk psychology and propositional
attitudes. For these reasons, basic animal minds are the best starting point. The
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content in place fields is not ghostly and has satisfaction conditions without any
need to refer to any social or linguistic practices.
Conclusion
The present account of representational mechanisms is sufficient to answer
Ramsey’s challenge and to solve the Hard Problem of Content. It points out that
there are at least two ways in which representations are causally relevant: (1) by
being referentially opaque, they are indispensable for explaining behavior,
especially in cases of misrepresentation, and (2) when their being in error is
detectable by the system, the account shows that the system does treat them as
representations. Representational mechanisms are not just useful for predicting and
explaining the system’s behavior; they are also specifically representational. Their
content has satisfaction conditions.
The idea that neural structures in basic minds might be representational as long as
they control behavior and are related to reward mechanisms is not just convenient,
and my argument for using it is not based on the assumption that more facts can be
subsumed under representational generalizations than under neural generalizations
(Pylyshyn 1984). By positing representational mechanisms, we may have a similar
level of generality as before. But generalization is not the most important factor for
explanation. After all, generalization may occur at the price of abstracting from
details, and the account of navigation in terms of simple taxis or tropisms could be
extrapolated from invertebrates to rodents, thus yielding a higher level of
generalization.
By using the account of representational mechanisms we may discover the
function of neural organization and understand why error-correcting pathways exist
in the first place. There is no real worry that the notion of representation may be
eliminated here; the function of neural mechanism is to represent, and to establish
this one need not warrant a gap between representational explanations and neural
explanations. In this case, integration of evidence at multiple levels in the
organization of mechanisms is much more important than the purported autonomy
of individual levels.
Satisfaction conditions are not constituted by structural informational relation-
ships, which are frequently discussed in the debate on content determination, but
they are essentially linked with control and evaluation. Both the job description
challenge and the Hard Problem of Content are solved by a naturalistic account of
satisfaction conditions in representational mechanisms. Although there is much
more to be said about satisfaction conditions, and about different possible kinds of
representational mechanism—I have provided some detail only for a particular
anticipatory mechanism recruiting S-representations—I think the overall story is
also plausible. The vindicated notion of representation is not as liberal to cover Watt
governors or mouse traps but selective enough to include a large number of basic
minds.
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